The Catatumbo region of northeastern Colombia had long been a battleground where competing armed factions fought for control of lucrative drug trafficking routes and agricultural territories. Nestled along the border with Venezuela in the department of Norte de Santander, Catatumbo had witnessed years of low-level but persistent violence since at least January 2018, when what analysts would later term the Catatumbo campaign began in earnest. The roots of this campaign lay in the 2016 peace agreement brokered under Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known by its Spanish acronym FARC. While that agreement was celebrated internationally as a landmark step toward ending one of Latin America's longest-running insurgencies, it created an immediate and deadly power vacuum. Not all FARC fighters accepted the terms, and dissident factions continued operating in the countryside, competing for the criminal revenue streams that the peace deal had left unaddressed.
The National Liberation Army, or ELN, Colombia's other major guerrilla organization which had not joined the 2016 accord, moved aggressively to fill that vacuum. In Catatumbo, the ELN clashed repeatedly with FARC dissident factions, particularly the 33rd Front, which had refused to demobilize after the ceasefire. A Human Rights Watch investigation brought the scope of this ongoing violence to international attention when the organization officially announced the existence of the Catatumbo campaign in August 2019, estimating that roughly 300,000 people had been directly affected by the conflict, while Colombian media reports placed that figure at around 145,000. The truth, however measured, pointed to a humanitarian catastrophe unfolding largely outside the gaze of the international community.
The violence escalated dramatically on January 16, 2025, when ELN militants launched a coordinated series of attacks against FARC dissident positions in the region. The initial assaults targeted the 33rd Front specifically, but the attacks quickly spiraled beyond the confines of an inter-guerrilla conflict. ELN militants were reported to be killing civilians they accused of collaborating with the FARC dissidents, dragging people from their homes and executing them in the streets, and conducting kidnappings across multiple communities. Community leader Carmelo Guerrero was among those confirmed killed, as were seven individuals who had been working toward a peace agreement. Three people engaged in peace talks were also reportedly kidnapped. The sheer scale and ferocity of the violence sent a wave of displacement across the region.
William Villamizar Laguado, the governor of Norte de Santander, described the resulting humanitarian situation as alarming. He confirmed that civilians had been captured, approximately two dozen people had been injured, and roughly 20,000 people had been displaced in the initial outbreak of violence. His early estimates suggested that more than 80 people had already been killed. On January 17, 2025, Colombian President Gustavo Petro announced the suspension of ongoing peace talks with the ELN, issuing a demand that the guerrillas cease all attacks immediately and allow government authorities to enter the affected areas to deliver humanitarian assistance to those trapped by the fighting.
As the violence continued into the following days, local officials moved to manage the humanitarian fallout. On January 18, the mayor of Ocaña ordered the city's stadium prepared as a reception center for the displaced, and called on the national government to declare a state of emergency. The death toll climbed relentlessly. By January 20, confirmed fatalities had surpassed 100 as fresh outbreaks of violence continued across the region. The Colombian government responded with escalating force. On January 21, President Petro formally declared a state of internal commotion and launched a military offensive against ELN guerrillas in Catatumbo. That same day, fourteen members of the FARC 33rd Front, including at least one minor, surrendered to the Colombian National Army in the municipalities of El Tarra and Tibú to avoid further combat, handing over their weapons in the process.
Colombian military and law enforcement continued to ratchet up pressure. On January 22, the Attorney General reactivated arrest warrants for 31 ELN leaders, including some who had participated in the ELN's own peace negotiations with the Petro administration. A reward of 700,000 dollars was subsequently offered for information leading to the capture of four specific ELN leaders: Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, Eliecer Herlinto Chamorro, Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo Quinchía, and Israel Ramírez Pineda. An emergency decree covering a 270-day period came into effect across the region.
On January 23, President Petro publicly accused Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, known by the alias Pablito, of masterminding the attacks. The following day, January 24, the 30th Army Brigade of the Colombian Army launched a large-scale ground offensive across eleven municipalities of Catatumbo, codenamed Operation Catatumbo, preceded by waves of artillery strikes. The Colombian military deployed a column of twenty M1117 armored vehicles alongside the 5th Mechanized Cavalry Squadron already engaged in the region, supported by Santa Bárbara Sistemas 155/52 heavy artillery pieces. More than a thousand special operatives from rapid deployment units were committed to the operation, whose declared objectives included recapturing all lost territory and reestablishing government authority throughout Catatumbo.
The January 2025 clashes brought the total number of confirmed dead to at least 103, with others injured, kidnapped, and displaced. The violence underscored the fragility of Colombia's peace process and the profound difficulty of extending state authority into territories long dominated by armed non-state actors. The events also illustrated the complex interplay between guerrilla factionalism, drug trafficking economics, and the humanitarian costs borne disproportionately by rural civilian populations who found themselves trapped between competing armed forces. For the Petro government, which had staked significant political capital on a policy of total peace through negotiations with multiple armed groups, the Catatumbo crisis represented a severe test of both strategy and resolve.
