French International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops were ambushed by Afghan Taliban insurgents, with heavy casualties, in the Uzbin Valley outside the village of Spēṟ Kunday in the Surobi District of Kabul province in eastern Afghanistan on 18 August 2008.
In the ambush and subsequent counter-attack operations involving reinforcements, 10 French soldiers were killed, as well as the Afghan interpreter; 21 French soldiers and 2 to 4 Afghan soldiers were wounded, and 20 to 40 civilians also lost their lives. The casualties for the French army were the highest single-day loss since the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, which killed 58 French soldiers.
Reports in France as well as a NATO one about the incident summarised that the surviving members of the initial coalition forces were "lucky to escape," arguing that they were not adequately supplied and equipped for the ambush and lacked preparation, while facing a planned attack by a well-prepared enemy. However, this version was denied by the French government and the NATO report was dismissed by NATO as a "mere field report" written by a soldier embedded in the patrol and featuring errors.
Later reports by the British newspaper The Times claimed that when the French group took over duties from the Italians, the relative calm of the region until that point had only been obtained by bribery, something the French were unaware of and which led to the assumption that the zone was largely secured already. But these claims were never confirmed, with the Italian Prime Minister calling them "totally baseless accusations". The French military likewise denied the accusations leveled against the Italians.
The sector of Surobi was under Italian control between 2006 and 2007. At the time, Italian troops crossed the 35th parallel only once, as the region beyond was considered to be dangerous. Then and until August 2008, responsibility for the Surobi district switched to 140 Italian troops who had undertaken development projects for the local population, as part of ISAF's "comprehensive approach" strategy. The district was considered a successful example of establishing security and was considered a quiet region despite the known presence of militants loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in remote areas. The Italian government understands its mandate to be a stabilization mission, without armed operations.
In August, French troops took over from the Italian force, as part of French president Nicolas Sarkozy's initiative to increase France's commitment to the war in Afghanistan. There had been a fear of militants attacking the three dams that operate in the region. In October 2009, The Times published an article stating that the relative calm in the region during the previous Italian occupation and since then had been obtained by Italian secret services bribing local Taliban groups into inaction. The French then ventured into areas with an over-optimistic threat assessment and insufficient equipment. A Taliban commander, Mohammed Ismayel, confirmed the existence of a deal with the Italians, though without corroborating the existence of any financial transactions, and explained that the more aggressive attitude of the French troops had caused the guerrillas to attack them. Silvio Berlusconi denied that any bribes were ever paid and rejected the claims as "totally baseless accusations". The French army explicitly denied the claims.
In contrast to the purely humanitarian operations carried out by the Italians, the French engaged in armed patrols to cut off guerrilla groups from their rear bases in Pakistan. On 15 August, a French patrol was dispatched to Spēṟ Kunday, but without exploring the surrounding passes. Local villagers warned them not to stay, due to the presence of the Taliban, but the French announced their intention to return. Thus, the guerrillas became aware of the French plans to reoccupy the area.
On 18 August, an ISAF column left FOB Tora in Surobi to assess guerrilla activity in the Uzbin valley. It was composed of some 100 troops in 20 vehicles, mostly French, accompanied by elements of the Afghan National Army and some U.S. Special Forces in charge of coordinating air support. The patrol was organized in
Carmin 2 ("Carmine 2"), a platoon of the 8th Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment (four VAB armoured personnel carriers, 31 men)
Rouge 4 ("Red 4"), a platoon of the Régiment de marche du Tchad
a platoon of the Afghan National Army (15 men on 2 pickup trucks) 1st Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps
a platoon of the Afghan National Guard (15 men on 2 pickup trucks)
a US Special Forces ODA (12 men), composed of a Close Air support team and its escort (3 Humvees).
USMC Embedded Training Team 6-3 (18 US Marines and 3 US Navy Corpsmen) with elements of 1st Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps, ANA
Their mission was to explore the field and make contact with local populations to reinforce control of the region. Uzbin Valley is the most populated valley of the sector, with 30,000 inhabitants. The patrol was aware that there were enemy combatants in the valley.
Two hours before the patrol reached the mountain pass, Omar Khattab was alerted and phoned local militant commanders Zabihullah Mujahed and Khalid Farooqi for support, as he began making plans for the attack. This advance warning raised suspicions that Afghan translators, who had deserted at Camp Tora, had leaked information, either voluntarily or under coercion; this was later denied both by the French Army and by the guerrillas, who claimed that they had lookouts and guarded weapon caches in the sector.
One hundred forty fighters took positions around the pass. According to official French statements, the group was composed mainly of non-Afghan elements. This was denied by the rebel leaders, who nevertheless acknowledge that weapons and funds were provided from abroad.
The ambush was mostly improvised by local leaders of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, later reinforced by Taliban forces, given the size of the operation, and villagers affiliated with either of these organizations. The ambush was part of a larger plan to surround Kabul, as it occurred on a road to Jalalabad, on which 70% of NATO supplies transit. Orders were given by the headquarters of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, in Pakistan, in liaison with the Taliban.