The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in April 1559 ended the Italian Wars (1494–1559). It consisted of two separate treaties, one between England and France on 2 April, and another between France and Spain on 3 April. Although he was not a signatory, both were approved by Emperor Ferdinand I, since many of the territorial exchanges concerned states within the Holy Roman Empire.
Henry II of France abandoned claims on the Italian states ruled by Philip II of Spain (the southern kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, along with the Duchy of Milan in the north), restored an independent Savoy, returned Corsica to Genoa, and formally recognised the Protestant Elizabeth I as queen of England, rather than her Catholic cousin, Mary, Queen of Scots. In exchange, France strengthened its southern, eastern and northern borders, confirming the occupation of the Three Bishoprics and the recapture of Calais from England.
The Italian Wars between the House of Valois and the House of Habsburg began in 1494, and lasted for over 60 years. For much of this period, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire were ruled by Emperor Charles V until he abdicated in January 1556 and divided his possessions. The lands of the Habsburg monarchy, often referred to as "Austria", went to his brother Ferdinand, who was also elected Holy Roman Emperor. His son Philip II of Spain, who married Mary I of England in July 1554, already ruled the Spanish Netherlands and Milan in his own right. The Spanish Empire, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia were added to these possessions.
This division was driven by the administrative complexity of managing the two empires as a single entity, but also reflected strategic differences. While Spain was a global maritime superpower, the Austrian Habsburgs focused on securing a pre-eminent position in Germany and managing the threat posed by the Ottoman Empire. A second area of divergence was how to respond to the Reformation, and growth of Protestantism. In Germany, conflict between Lutheran and Catholic princes resulted in the 1552 Second Schmalkaldic War, settled by the 1556 Peace of Augsburg.
Unlike Ferdinand, who favoured compromise with his Protestant subjects, Charles and Philip responded to the rise of Calvinism in the Spanish Netherlands with repression, a policy that eventually led to the Dutch War of Independence in 1568. Although the two Habsburg branches cooperated when their aims converged, Ferdinand was more focused on restoring order to the Empire, and dealing with the Ottomans. Philip kept fighting, but recognised peace with France would enable him to deal with the rebellious Dutch. Victories at St Quentin in 1557 and Gravelines in August 1558 allowed him to negotiate from strength.
Despite these successes, Philip was struggling to finance the war, and in December 1558 advised his commander in Flanders, Emmanuel Philibert, that he could no longer pay his troops. Similar problems meant Henry II of France was also willing to reach an agreement, especially after France occupied the Three Bishoprics in 1552, and recaptured Calais in January 1558. In addition, internal divisions caused by the rise of Protestantism in France exacerbated splits within the nobility, and led to the outbreak of the French Wars of Religion in 1562.
Finally, England was also anxious to end the war, which it had entered in alliance with Spain and which was widely seen as a disastrous decision. The capture of Calais after more than 200 years severely damaged English prestige and deprived them of a bridgehead which had allowed English troops to cross the English Channel and intervene in mainland Europe with relative ease.
After three years of war, both the French and Spanish courts were making overtures for peace talks as early as November 1554. The first serious Franco-Spanish peace negotiations, although preliminary, were held at the Conference of Marck within the Pale of Calais – on then-neutral English soil – in June 1555. However, both sides made mistakes and the conference was a failure; they wanted peace, but were not ready for reconciliation yet. The failure caused both kings to desire revenge, but as their armies and finances were exhausted, they remained on the defensive and the military situation barely changed. By October 1555, diplomacy had resumed, and the Truce of Vaucelles was agreed on 5 February 1556, somewhat favourable to France. But rather than a step towards peace, Vaucelles proved to be but a lull in the war; continued desire for revenge led to numerous incidents during the negotiations, and the stipulations of the truce were never fully implemented and observed before war resumed in September 1556 with the Spanish invasion of the pro-French Papal States.
Initially, there were attempts on both sides to limit the conflict to the Papal States, but by December 1556, preparations were made for a resumption of hostilities on all fronts, and on 6 January 1557 Gaspard II de Coligny (French governor of Picardy) launched surprise attacks on Douai and Lens in the Spanish Netherlands. The Spanish victory in the Battle of St. Quentin (1557) (10–27 August) turned out to be decisive; while England had entered the war on Spain's side, France lost one ally after the other, including the Pope, who signed a separate peace on 12 September 1557. However, Henry managed to surprise friend and foe by conquering Calais in January 1558, and negotiated a marriage between Mary, Queen of Scots and his son Francis (19 April 1558); although not quite able to make up for his loss at St. Quentin, it allowed Henry to save face and obtain a better position at the negotiation table.
Peace talks between Spain, England and France began in early 1558, but little progress was made; France refused to contemplate Mary's demand for the return of Calais, and her marriage to Philip made it difficult for England to negotiate separately. The Franco-Spanish talks at Marcoing near Cambrai, initiated by France, lasted just three days (15–17 May 1558) and came to nothing, mostly because the Siege of Thionville (1558) was ongoing, Granvelle sought to gain time by negotiations to allow the Spanish army in the Netherlands to prepare for war, and both parties could not find diplomatic common ground.
Presiding negotiator: Christina of Denmark, former Duchess consort of Lorraine (1544–1545)
Chief Spanish negotiator: Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle
Other Spanish negotiators: Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, 3rd Duke of Alba; William I, Prince of Orange; Ruy Gómez de Silva, 1st Prince of Éboli
Chief French negotiator: Anne de Montmorency
Other French negotiators: Jacques d'Albon, Seigneur de Saint André; Charles de Guise, Cardinal of Lorraine; Jean de Morvillier, bishop of Orléans; and the French secretary of state Claude de l'Aubespine
Chief English negotiator: Henry Fitzalan, 12th Earl of Arundel
Other English negotiators: Thomas Thirlby, bishop of Ely; Nicholas Wotton, the dean of Canterbury and York; and William Howard, 1st Baron Howard of Effingham
Ambassadors of other states not directly involved in the negotiations were not permitted to attend; this especially disadvantaged Italian states, because decisions about their futures were made.