Tomoyuki Yamashita (山下 奉文, Yamashita Tomoyuki; 8 November 1885 – 23 February 1946; also called Tomobumi Yamashita) was a general in the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II. Yamashita led Japanese forces during the invasion of Malaya and Battle of Singapore. His conquest of Malaya and Singapore in 70 days earned him the sobriquet "The Tiger of Malaya". He was assigned to defend the Philippines from the advancing Allies later in the war. Although he was unable to prevent the superior Allied forces from advancing, despite dwindling supplies and Allied guerrilla action, he was able to hold on to part of Luzon until after the formal surrender of Japan in August 1945.
Under Yamashita's command, at least 350,000 to 450,000 were killed. Yamashita was in overall command during the Sook Ching massacre, the Rape of Manila, and other atrocities. After the war, Yamashita was tried for war crimes committed by troops under his command during the Japanese defense of the occupied Philippines in 1944. Yamashita denied ordering those war crimes and said that he did not have knowledge that they occurred. Conflicting evidence was presented during the trial concerning whether Yamashita had implicitly affirmed commission of these crimes in his orders and whether he knew of the crimes being committed. The court eventually found Yamashita guilty and he was executed in February, 1946. The ruling against Yamashita – holding the commander responsible for subordinates' war crimes as long as the commander did not attempt to discover and stop them from occurring – came to be known as the Yamashita standard.
Yamashita was the second son of a local physician in Osugi, a village in what is now part of Ōtoyo, Kōchi Prefecture, Shikoku. He attended military preparatory schools in his youth.
In November 1905, Yamashita graduated from the 18th class of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy. He was ranked 16th out of 920 cadets. In December 1908 he was promoted to lieutenant and fought against the German Empire in World War I in Shandong, China in 1914. In May 1916 he was promoted to captain. He attended the 28th class of the Army War College, graduating sixth in his class in 1916. The same year, he married Hisako Nagayama, daughter of retired Gen. Nagayama. Yamashita became an expert on Germany, serving as assistant military attaché at Bern and Berlin from 1919 to 1922.
In February 1922, he was promoted to major. He twice served in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry responsible for the Ugaki Army Reduction Program, aimed at reforming the Japanese army by streamlining its organisation despite facing fierce opposition from factions within the Army.
In 1922, upon his return to Japan, Major Yamashita served in the Imperial Headquarters and the Staff College, receiving promotion to lieutenant-colonel in August 1925. While posted to the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff, Yamashita unsuccessfully promoted a military reduction plan. Despite his ability, Yamashita fell into disfavor as a result of his involvement with political factions within the Japanese military.
As a leading member of the "Imperial Way" group, he became a rival to Hideki Tojo and other members of the "Control Faction". In 1927 Yamashita was posted to Vienna, Austria, as a military attaché until 1930. He was then promoted to the rank of colonel. In 1930 Col. Yamashita was given command of the elite 3rd Imperial Infantry Regiment (Imperial Guards Division). He was promoted to major-general in August 1934.
After the February 26 Incident of 1936, he fell into disfavor with Emperor Hirohito due to his appeal for leniency toward rebel officers involved in the attempted coup. He realized that he had lost the trust of the Emperor and decided to resign from the Army—a decision that his superiors dissuaded him from carrying out. He was eventually relegated to a post in Korea, being given command of a brigade. Akashi Yoji argued in his article "General Yamashita Tomoyuki: Commander of the Twenty-Fifth Army" that his time in Korea gave him the chance to reflect on his conduct during the 1936 coup and at the same time study Zen Buddhism, something which caused him to mellow in character yet instilled a high level of discipline.
Yamashita was promoted to lieutenant-general in November 1937. He insisted that Japan should end the conflict with China and keep peaceful relations with the United States and Great Britain, but he was ignored and subsequently assigned to an unimportant post in the Kwantung Army.
From 1938 to 1940, he was assigned to command the IJA 4th Division which saw some action in northern China against insurgents fighting the occupying Japanese armies. In December 1940 Yamashita was sent on a six-month clandestine military mission to Germany (meeting Adolf Hitler in Berlin on 16 June 1941) and Italy, meeting Benito Mussolini.
Throughout his time in the military, Yamashita had consistently urged the implementation of his proposals, which included "streamlining the air arm, to mechanize the Army, to integrate control of the armed forces in a defense ministry coordinated by a chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, to create a paratroop corps and to employ effective propaganda".
Such strategies caused much friction between himself and Gen. Hideki Tojo, the war minister, who was not keen on implementing these proposals.
On 6 November 1941 Lt. Gen. Yamashita was put in command of the Twenty-Fifth Army. It was his belief that victory in Malaya would be successful only if his troops could make an amphibious landing—something that was dependent on whether he would have enough air and naval support to provide a good landing site.
On 8 December he launched an invasion of Malaya from bases in French Indochina. Yamashita remarked that only a "driving charge" would ensure victory in Malaya. This is because the Japanese force was about one-third as large as the opposing British forces in Malaya and Singapore. The plan was to conquer Malaya and Singapore as quickly as possible in order to overcome any numerical disadvantage and minimize any potential losses from a long, drawn-out battle.
The Malayan campaign concluded with the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, in which Yamashita's 30,000 front-line soldiers captured 80,000 British, Indian and Australian troops, the largest surrender of British-led personnel in history. This victory earned him the sobriquet "Tiger of Malaya".
The campaign and the subsequent Japanese occupation of Singapore included war crimes committed against captive Allied personnel and civilians, such as the Alexandra Hospital and Sook Ching massacres. Yamashita's culpability for these events remains a matter of controversy as some argued that he had failed to prevent them. The order to execute 50,000 Chinese came, according to postwar testimony, from senior officers within Yamashita's Operations staff. Yamashita's troops had fought in China, where it was customary to conduct massacres to subdue the population. Major Ōnishi Satoru, one of the accused in the postwar trial, affirmed that he acted under a specific order issued from General Headquarters, that read, 'Due to the fact that the army is advancing fast and in order to preserve peace behind us it is essential to massacre as many Chinese as possible who appear in any way to have anti-Japanese feelings.'
Yamashita later apologized to the few survivors of the 650 bayoneted or shot at Alexandra Hospital, and allegedly some soldiers caught looting in the aftermath of the slaughter were executed. Akashi Yoji claims that this would have been in line with Yamashita's personality and belief. According to him, the first orders given by Yamashita to the soldiers was "no looting; no rape; no arson", and that any soldier committing such acts would be severely punished and his superior held accountable.
Nevertheless, Yamashita's warnings to his troops were generally not heeded, and wanton acts of violence were reported. In his article, Akashi argued that the main issue was that despite being an excellent tactician and leader, his personal ideals constantly placed him at odds with the General Staff and War Ministry. His humane treatment of prisoners of war as well as British leaders was something the other officers had difficulty coming to terms with.