The siege of Quebec, also known as the second siege of Quebec, was a 1760 French attempt to retake Quebec City, in New France, which had been captured by Britain the previous year. The siege lasted from 29 April to 15 May, when British ships arrived to relieve the city and compelled the French commander, François Gaston de Lévis, to break off the siege and to retreat. The British launched the Montreal campaign a few months later, which resulted in the city's capture. French resistance ceased, and the British conquest of New France was complete, as was confirmed in 1763 by the Treaty of Paris.
In 1759, a British expedition, led by James Wolfe, had sailed up the St Lawrence River and laid siege to Quebec. After an initial failure at the Battle of Beauport, Wolfe managed to defeat the French field army under Louis-Joseph de Montcalm at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham on 13 September 1759. After Montcalm's death during the battle, the French armies outside Quebec retreated westwards despite their numerical supremacy and left the garrison of Quebec exposed to the British. The city surrendered several days later, and British forces under James Murray marched in and occupied it.
The retreating French troops had reached the Jacques-Cartier River, where they came under the command of François Gaston de Lévis on 17 September 1759. He initially hoped to lead his force back to recapture Quebec directly, but it became clear that such an immediate attack was impossible, and he decided to postpone any attempt until the following year. During the winter, Lévis's forces camped near the Jacques-Cartier River. In spite of his decision not to attack, rumours continued to circulate around Quebec throughout the winter that a major French assault was imminent. Lévis rejected a proposal by Murray for a winter truce. French patrols continued to operate and a position was even set up at Saint-Augustin close to Quebec until it was captured in a surprise attack by the British using snow shoes.
Lévis prepared his attack during the winter, and sent a message to Paris in October 1759 asking for reinforcements, siege artillery and supplies to be sent to Quebec as soon as possible. He was determined to press on as soon as the ice began to melt making the St Lawrence passable. On 20 April his force set out from Montreal, and reached the village of Sainte-Foy by 27 April. He had around 7,000 troops, around half were French regulars the remainder were Canadian militia and Native allies, and twelve artillery pieces. Some of the British expedition who had captured Quebec the previous autumn departed shortly afterwards with the fleet, leaving Murray with around 7,000 troops to defend the city. Because of a variety of ailments, shortages of food and weather a thousand of these troops had died, and two thousand more were ill, meaning Murray had only around 4,000 men in condition to fight.
Murray received warning of the French approach on the morning of 27 April costing Lévis the element of surprise he had hoped for. Murray's response to the appearance of Lévis and his force outside the city was to march out and take up a strong defensive position. He hoped Lévis would attack him, but it also allowed Murray time to withdraw his outposts of light infantry, some of them at Cap Rouge, who would otherwise have been cut off.
Lévis declined to attack Murray since he realised that the battlefield would not suit his plans. Instead, during the night, he chose to move his army to outflank Murray, using the woods on the British left as cover. Faced with the new threat, Murray, withdrew to a new position close to where the Battle of the Plains of Abraham had been fought the previous September. Instead of withdrawing back into the city, Murray elected to give battle. That was something of a gamble, which Murray justified by observing "that our little Army was in the habit of beating that Enemy" and because he feared the ability of his forces to withstand a siege. Murray had 3,800 troops in the field, virtually every soldier in Quebec fit to carry a musket, and Lévis had a similar number of men to hand although further forces were on their way.
Lévis did not expect the British to give battle and was surprised to see them the following day. The battle began when Murray saw that the French main body was still on the march and had not yet formed up. Impulsively, abandoning the high ground, the British decided to attack. Their advance was slowed by the terrain, a mixture of half-melted snow and mud, and by the time the two sides engaged, the French were prepared. Initially, the British had success, driving the outlying French from their strong points and sending panic through the French ranks, which led some to flee into the nearby woods. The British pressed on and ran into the main body of French troops under Lévis.
After around an hour of close-quarters fighting, the British flanks began to give way, and Murray ordered a withdrawal. The French then completed their victory by capturing the abandoned British artillery. The battle was even bloodier than the one fought a year earlier: Lévis suffered 833 killed and wounded, while the British under Murray sustained 1,088 casualties—nearly a third of his force.
Seeing that there was no chance of salvaging the situation, Murray retreated with his remaining forces back into the city and prepared to hold out in the hope that relief would arrive up the Saint Lawrence for the defenders. Lévis had similar hopes, although he was realistic about the chances of any French relief, as he brought up the rest of his forces and began preparing to lay siege to the city. The captured British artillery was added to the French guns brought from Montreal.
On 29 April, the day after the battle, the siege commenced, but Lévis had not originally intended to besiege Quebec, as he was waiting for reinforcements from France. As a result, he chose not to launch an immediate assault; his troops were too exhausted, and he was uncertain about the reliability of some of the militiamen. Instead, he occupied the hospital outside the city walls and began bringing up the artillery. However, Lévis refused to open fire with any cannon or mortars until he had forty guns in position, intending to unleash a devastating barrage.
Murray, meanwhile, drew up plans, if the city were to fall to the French, to withdraw to the Île d'Orléans to the east and wait for reinforcements to arrive. As the French siege works began to take shape, morale plummeted for the British and teetered on the brink of anarchy. Fearing a wider breakdown in discipline, Murray ordered harsh punishments for offenders. One man was hanged on the spot for endemic drunkenness, and Murray had all the liquor in the Lower Town poured away or destroyed. Nevertheless, the French siege works were soon being bombarded with considerable accuracy, and by May 1, order, subordination, hope, and almost confidence were completely restored in Murray's army.
The city's defences, however, had been shattered by the previous year's bombardment, and it had even been suggested after its capture that the British should simply destroy the fortifications and abandon the city. Instead, work parties had tried to rebuild the fortifications, and Murray also concentrated on erecting defences beyond the city walls. The weakness of the city's defences had a major impact on his decision to confront the French in open battle, rather than remain in the city. In addition, such was the shortage of men that British officers strapped themselves into harnesses to help haul cannon into the Lower Town.
Concerned that a hostile population would add to his problems, Murray had tried to exhibit kindness to the local inhabitants if they disarmed and swore allegiance to George II. This policy had proved generally successful, although it was clear most of the inhabitants hoped for a French return. Murray had expelled several inhabitants from the city suspected of supplying intelligence to the French and of encouraging British troops to desert. On May 2, Murray ordered the few inhabitants remaining in the place to leave within three days.