On October 14, 2004, Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701, a Bombardier CRJ200 on a repositioning flight from Little Rock to Minneapolis, crashed while attempting an emergency approach to Jefferson City Memorial Airport in Missouri, United States. Both pilots, the only two people on board, were killed. The aircraft was originally scheduled to fly a passenger flight from Little Rock to Minneapolis earlier that day, but a mechanical issue forced the flight to be delayed. Since the aircraft was still needed for Pinnacle Airlines operations out of Minneapolis the next day, the airline elected to ferry the aircraft to Minneapolis. The two pilots on board made the aircraft climb to 41,000 ft (12,000 m), the maximum operating altitude of the CRJ200, but did not ensure a safe airspeed for the high altitude they were flying at. Due to the low energy state of the aircraft, it subsequently stalled and, due to interrupted airflow, both engines flamed out. The crew failed to execute the proper dual engine failure checklists and did not glide the aircraft to a suitable airport. The plane crashed in a residential area short of the runway and was destroyed.
The investigation, conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board, found several factors that led to the accident. Investigators found that during the flight the crew had intentionally deviated from standard operating procedures, displayed unprofessional cockpit attitude, and aggressively maneuvered the aircraft. In particular, investigators discovered that Pinnacle Airlines flight crews had expressed curiosity in flying at the CRJ200's service ceiling and pilots who had done so informally called it the "410 club". Data from the flight recorders indicated that the crew did not anticipate the upset and improperly executed the checklist procedures. The crew did not effectively communicate with air traffic control about their emergency situation and did not fully discuss potential landing sites. Investigators also determined that the engines core locked during the accident sequence, which prevented the crew from restarting them, and the available documentation to the crew did not communicate the importance of preventing core lock.
The aircraft involved in the accident was a Bombardier CRJ200, registered as N8396A. By the time of the accident, it had a total of 10,168 airframe hours and 9,613 flights. Pinnacle Airlines acquired the airframe in May 2000, soon after it was manufactured. The aircraft was powered by two General Electric CF34-3B1 turbofan engines. The certified maximum operating altitude of the CRJ200 is 41,000 ft (12,000 m). The aircraft was equipped with an auxiliary power unit (APU), which provides power to the aircraft when the engines are not operating. An engine restart can be conducted by using bleed air from the APU to rotate the engine core. The Bombardier CRJ200 is equipped with a stick shaker, which warns the crew of an impending stall, and a stick pusher, which pitches the aircraft down to prevent a stall.
On the day of the accident, the aircraft was operating a repositioning flight flown by two pilots. The captain was 31-year-old Jesse Rhodes. Rhodes graduated from the Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida in 1995 and began working as a flight instructor there between 1996 and 1999. He was hired by Pinnacle Airlines in February 2004. By the time of the accident, he had a total of 6,900 flight hours, 973 of which were on the CRJ. Pilots who had previously flown with Rhodes had given favorable comments to him and the simulator instructor responsible for his upgrade training stated that he flew the plane "just fine" but noted deficiencies in critical decision-making and judgement.
The first officer of the flight was 23-year-old Peter Cesarz. Cesarz began training to become a first officer in October 2002 and was hired by Pinnacle Airlines in April 2004. By the time of the accident, he had accumulated 761 flight hours in total, 222 of which on the CRJ. Captains who had flown with Cesarz described him as a confident pilot and a simulator instructor stated that he had a positive attitude.
At the time of the accident, Pinnacle Airlines was a regional airline and subsidiary of Northwest Airlines. The airline was initially founded in 1985 as Express Airlines I with turboprop aircraft only. The airline began to expand its fleet with CRJ aircraft in 2001, and changed its name to Pinnacle Airlines the following year. At the time of the accident, the airline employed approximately 900 pilots and had a fleet of 110 CRJ aircraft. Pinnacle Airlines was doing business as (d/b/a) Northwest Airlink, the regional commuter service for Northwest Airlines. The airline gave training on upsets, high-altitude climbs, dual engine failures, stalls, and crew resource management. Training on high-altitude climbs included discussion on flight at 41,000 ft (12,000 m), but operations at this altitude were not demonstrated in simulator training. Flight crew operating manuals from the airline instructed crews flying above 36,000 ft (11,000 m) to maintain a minimum climb airspeed of 250 kn (460 km/h) and a rate-of-climb of at least 300 ft/min (91 m/min). The airline's checklist instructed crews after a dual engine failure to maintain an airspeed of 240 kn (440 km/h) before attempting an engine restart, and once at or below an altitude of 21,000 ft (6,400 m), increase the airspeed to 300 kn (560 km/h) to initiate a windmill restart. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Flight Standards District Office in Memphis, Tennessee, was responsible for overseeing Pinnacle Airlines.
At Pinnacle Airlines, there was an unofficial group of Bombardier CRJ pilots who had flown the aircraft up to its service ceiling of 41,000 ft (12,000 m) or flight level 410, informally referred to as the "410 club". Testimony of pilots who had climbed to flight level 410 indicated that these climbs were conducted on repositioning flights. Before the crash of Flight 3701, management at the airline, including the chief pilot, the vice president of safety, and the CRJ program manager, were unaware of the club's existence.
The power curve relates the airspeed of an aircraft in level flight to the engine thrust required. On a graph with airspeed on the x-axis and thrust required on the y-axis, the power curve is an upward-opening curve where a given thrust is required to maintain a certain airspeed. In order to maintain the same altitude, an aircraft must balance thrust with drag. An aircraft requires more thrust to fly at higher airspeeds as the parasitic drag increases. "Falling behind the power curve" is a situation that can happen to an aircraft when it begins to fly slower while maintaining the same altitude. In order to maintain constant lift (and thus altitude) while decelerating, the aircraft must increase in angle of attack (AoA). The increase in AoA results in induced drag increasing. As drag increases, airspeed decreases, necessitating an even higher AoA to maintain altitude. Therefore, more thrust would be required to maintain the high AoA at the lower airspeed. If the airspeed becomes too low and the available engine thrust falls below what is required to maintain a certain airspeed, level flight becomes impossible.
On October 14, 2004, N8396A was scheduled to fly from Adams Field in Little Rock, Arkansas, to Minneapolis–Saint Paul International Airport in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The crew of that flight, who were different from the accident flight, received a caution message relating to a bleed air duct fault and rejected the takeoff. However, Pinnacle Airlines still needed the aircraft in Minneapolis the following day, where the airplane's next flight was scheduled. The airline notified Captain Rhodes and First Officer Cesarz about the repositioning flight they planned the pilots to fly. The pilots arrived in Little Rock by use of deadheading on company flights and began preparing for the flight.
Flight 3701 departed Little Rock for Minneapolis at 21:21 with a flight plan that indicated a planned cruising pressure altitude of 33,000 feet (10,000 m). Five seconds after takeoff at an altitude of 450 ft (140 m), the crew conducted an abrupt pitch maneuver. The pitch of the aircraft rose to 22° nose-up and the vertical load on the airframe increased to 1.8 Gs. This resulted in the activation of the stick shaker followed soon after by the stick pusher. The pitch angle was subsequently reduced and the crew continued to climb.