The National Security Act of 1947 (Pub.L. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495, enacted July 26, 1947) is a law enacting major restructuring of the United States government's military and intelligence agencies following World War II. The majority of the provisions of the act took effect on September 18, 1947, the day after the Senate confirmed James Forrestal as the first secretary of defense.
The act merged the Department of the Army (renamed from the Department of War), the Department of the Navy, and the newly established Department of the Air Force (DAF) into the National Military Establishment (NME). The act also created the position of the secretary of defense as the head of the NME. It established the United States Air Force under the DAF, which worked to separate the Army Air Forces into its own service. It also protected the Marine Corps as an independent service under the Department of the Navy. Aside from the unification of the three military departments, the act established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, the latter of which is headed by the director of central intelligence.
The legislation was a result of efforts beginning in 1944. President Harry S. Truman proposed the legislation to Congress on February 26, 1947. The bill was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on February 28, 1947, and in the Senate on March 3, 1947. Senator Chan Gurney was the bill's sponsor. Senator Gurney, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, led committee hearings for the bill from mid-March to early May. The bill passed in the Senate on July 9, 1947, and in the House on July 19, 1947. The Senate agreed to a related House resolution (H.Con.Res. 70) on July 16, 1947. The bill received bipartisan support and was passed in both chambers by voice vote. The National Security Act of 1947 was signed into law by President Truman on July 26, 1947, while aboard his VC-54C presidential aircraft Sacred Cow.
From 1921 to 1945, Congress considered approximately 50 bills to reorganize the armed forces. Mostly due to opposition by both the Department of the Navy and the War Department, all but one failed to reach the floor of the House, and even this one was defeated by a vote of 153 to 135 in 1932. However, by the end of World War II, several factors forced leaders to more seriously consider restructuring the military to improve unity.
By 1945, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had already been investigated several times, for example by the Roberts Commission, and would continue to be investigated through almost the end of the century. One of the findings that emerged was the probable role of intelligence failures linked to interservice bickering between Pearl Harbor's Army and Navy commanders, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. Though not a court martial, the Roberts Commission explicitly accused the two of dereliction of duty for not conferring to coordinate in light of the warnings.
Joint operations in World War II
During World War II, interservice cooperation remained voluntary, requiring complex interchanges of liaisons for planning and operations. Additionally, the Army and Navy often competed for resources, for example industrial production and new recruits. Enabling operations under these conditions had required the creation of numerous joint agencies and interdepartmental committees.
World War II had also given the US military two case studies of joint operations between Europe and the Pacific. In the Pacific, the Army and Navy had experienced constant friction from command and logistics problems. In Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), created based on the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, had smoothed over these coordination problems and became President Roosevelt's principal military advisors.
The JCS became a key source of advocacy for creating a single unified military department after the war. Following studies by the JCS Joint Strategic Survey Committee on ways to resolve joint roles and missions problems, George Marshall published a memo in support of postwar unification on November 2, 1942. Marshall's memo called for the following:
Reorganizing the Navy and War Departments into a single department led by a civilian secretary
Creating an independent air force under the new department
Creating an independent supply service under the new department
Placing each of the four services under a civilian secretary and a military chief of staff
Creating a "United States General Staff" made up of the four service chiefs plus a chief of staff to the President.
During both world wars, but particularly World War II, aviation had become increasingly important. The aircraft carrier had overtaken the battleship as the Navy's premier surface combatant. Army airmen had called for an independent air service since 1919, and the Army's Air Corps had already been expanded into what bordered on a separate service. Finally, the advent of nuclear weapons delivered by bombers led some leaders, such as Curtis LeMay, to believe air power would inevitably become more decisive than ground warfare or sea power. The time seemed right to create an independent air force, but it would require congressional action.
Immediately following the war, confronting the Soviets was a lower priority than ending wartime austerity, balancing the federal budget, and returning to peace. This situation would not change until the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons in 1949, followed by the Korean War in 1950.
In this environment, forces were rapidly demobilized, and budgets were slashed. In Fiscal Year 1946, the military's total budget ceiling was approximately $42 billion. In fiscal year 1947, it was $14 billion. On V-J Day, the US military consisted of the Army's 91 Army divisions, 9 Marine Corps divisions, 1,166 combat ships in the Navy, and 213 combat groups in the Army Air Forces. By the end of demobilization on June 30, 1947, the Army had 10 divisions, the Marine Corps had 2 divisions, the Navy had 343 combat ships, and the Army Air Forces had 63 groups of which only 11 were fully operational.
As forces were reduced and budgets were cut, unification seemed like a promising way to save money by reducing duplication, and this would become a theme to which its proponents would repeatedly return. It also created a sense of urgency to quickly institutionalize lessons learned from World War II. However, the shrinking budgets also created a zero-sum game environment which encouraged interservice bickering by pitting Army and Navy advocates against each other.