The Harrow and Wealdstone rail crash was a three-train collision at Harrow and Wealdstone station in Wealdstone, Middlesex (now Greater London) during the morning rush hour of 8 October 1952. The crash resulted in 112 deaths and 340 injuries, 88 of these being detained in hospital. It remains the worst peacetime rail crash in British history and the second deadliest overall after the Quintinshill rail disaster of 1915.
An overnight express train from Perth crashed into the rear of a local passenger train standing at a platform at the station. The wreckage blocked adjacent lines and was struck within seconds by a double-headed express train travelling north at 60 mph (100 km/h). The Ministry of Transport report on the crash concluded that the driver of the Perth train had passed a caution signal and two danger signals before colliding with the local train. The reason for this was never established, as both the driver and the fireman of the Perth train were killed in the accident.
The accident accelerated the introduction of the Automatic Warning System, and British Railways agreed to a five-year plan to install the system, which gave drivers an in-cab audible and visual warning when nearing a signal at caution, actuated by magnets between the rails.
Harrow and Wealdstone station is located on the West Coast Main Line from London to Birmingham, about 11 miles (18 km) from the line's southern terminus at London's Euston station. There are three pairs of running lines through the station. From east to west these are the slow lines, the fast lines of the West Coast Main Line, and the DC electric lines. In each case, the "up" line is southbound towards London Euston; the "down" line is the northbound line towards Watford and Birmingham.
The collisions involved three trains:
The 7:31 a.m. Tring to Euston local passenger train—9 carriages carrying approximately 800 passengers hauled by LMS Fowler 2-6-4T Class No. 42389 steam locomotive—standing at the platform on the up fast line.
The 8:15 p.m. Perth to Euston night express—11 carriages carrying approximately 85 passengers hauled by LMS Coronation Class No. 46242 City of Glasgow steam locomotive—on the up fast line, running about 80 minutes late because of fog.
The 8:00 a.m. express from Euston to Liverpool and Manchester—15 carriages carrying approximately 200 passengers, double headed by LMS Jubilee Class No. 45637 Windward Islands and LMS Princess Royal Class No. 46202 Princess Anne steam locomotives—on the down fast line.
On 8 October 1952, at around 8:17 a.m., the local train stopped at platform 4 at Harrow and Wealdstone station, approximately seven minutes late because of fog. Carrying about 800 passengers, it was busier than usual because the next Tring-Euston service had been cancelled. As scheduled, it had travelled from Tring on the slow line, switching to the up fast line just before Harrow and Wealdstone to keep the slow lines to the south of the station clear for empty stock movements. At 8:19 a.m, just as the guard was walking back to his brake van after checking doors on the last two carriages, the Perth express crashed into the rear of the local at a speed of 50–60 miles per hour (80–100 km/h). It had passed a colour light signal at caution and two semaphore signals at danger, and had burst through the trailing points of the crossover from the slow lines, which were still set for the local train.
The collision drove the entire local train forward 20 yards (18 m), and completely destroyed the rear three coaches, shattering the wooden bodies of the last two and crushing the steel body of the next to a third of its length; the three were telescoped into the length of little more than one coach. The leading two vans and three coaches of the Perth train piled up behind and above the locomotive.
The wreckage from the first collision was spread across the adjacent down fast line. A few seconds after the first collision, the northbound express to Liverpool Lime Street passed through the station on this line in the opposite direction at approximately 60 miles per hour (100 km/h). The leading locomotive of this train struck the derailed locomotive of the Perth train, which may still have been moving, and was itself derailed. The two locomotives from the Liverpool train were deflected left, mounting the platform, which they ploughed across diagonally before landing on their sides on the adjacent DC electric line, one line of which was short circuited by the wreckage; the other line had its electric current quickly switched off by the signalman, thus preventing any further collisions. The leading seven coaches, plus a kitchen car from the Liverpool train, were carried forward by momentum, overriding the existing wreckage and piling up above and around it. Several of these coaches struck the underside of the station footbridge, tearing away a steel girder.
Sixteen vehicles, including thirteen coaches, two bogie vans and a kitchen car were destroyed or severely damaged in the collisions. Thirteen of these were compressed into a compact heap of wreckage 45 yards (41 m) long, 18 yards (16 m) wide and 6 yards (5.5 m) high. The Perth locomotive was completely buried under the pile of wreckage.
The first emergency response arrived at 8:22 a.m. with the fire brigade, ambulance and police services being assisted by doctors and a medical unit of the United States Air Force, based five miles (8 km) away at RAF South Ruislip. This included Abbie Sweetwine, an African American nurse who became known as "The Angel of Platform Six". Help was accepted from the Salvation Army, the Women's Voluntary Service and local residents. The first loaded ambulance left at 8:27 a.m. and by 12:15 p.m. most of the injured had been taken to hospital. The search for survivors continued until 1:30 the following morning.
All six lines running through the station were closed including the undamaged slow lines to allow the injured access to ambulances that left from the goods yard. The slow lines reopened at 5:32 a.m. the following day. The electric lines were used by cranes to remove the Liverpool locomotives and carriages and reopened 4:30 a.m. on 11 October. The fast lines were reopened, with a speed restriction, at 8:00 p.m. on 12 October and a temporary footbridge was opened the same evening.
There were 112 fatalities, including the driver and fireman of the Perth express and the driver of the lead engine of the Liverpool express (the fireman was thrown from the cab by the collision without serious injury). Of the fatalities, 102 perished at the scene, and the remaining 10 died later in hospital from their injuries. Of the 109 passenger fatalities, at least 64 occurred in the local train, 23 in the Perth train, and 7 in the Liverpool train, but where the remaining 14 were from was not clear; some of them may have been standing on the platform and hit by the derailed locomotives of the Liverpool train. A total of 340 people were reported injured: 183 people were given treatment for shock and minor injury at the station and 157 were taken to hospital, of whom 88 were hospitalised.
The Ministry of Transport report on the collision was written by Lt Col GRS Wilson, a senior member of the Railway Inspectorate, and published in June 1953. The local train should have been protected by two semaphore home signals; the Up Fast Inner Home about 190 yards (170 m) to its rear, and the Up Fast Outer Home a further 440 yards (400 m) back. A colour distant signal (the Up Fast Distant) would show green if the Outer Home and Inner Home were both 'clear', or yellow if the Outer Home or Inner Home were at 'danger' and was positioned 1,474 yards (1,348 m) before the Up Fast Outer home; this being the full braking distance for an express at 75 miles per hour (120 km/h), the speed limit for this section of track.
Tests showed no signalling equipment faults and the report was able to dismiss the possibility that the signalman had only changed the route after the Perth train had passed the distant signal at caution. The driver of the Perth train had not slowed his train in response to this signal and had then passed two danger signals before colliding with the Tring train. All the evidence suggested that the driver had made no attempt to stop until the very last moment; eyewitnesses on board the Perth train reported that an emergency brake application was made a few seconds before the collision.