The Great Boston Fire of 1872 stands as the largest fire in the history of Boston, Massachusetts, and ranks as one of the most costly fire-related property losses in American history. The conflagration began at 7:20 p.m. on November 9, 1872, in the basement of a commercial warehouse at 83–87 Summer Street. The fire was finally contained around midday on November 10, after it had consumed about 65 acres (26 ha) of Boston's downtown, 776 buildings, and much of the financial district. It caused $73.5 million in damage ($1.98 billion in 2025)—buildings losses totaled $13.5 million and the personal property loss was valued at $60 million. The number of fatalities is believed to have been 26 to "at least 30", depending on source, including 11 or 12 firefighters.
In 1872, there was no strictly enforced building code in Boston. The streets were narrow and the buildings were close together. Many of the buildings were too tall for fire ladders to reach the upper levels, and the pressure from the fire hoses was often insufficient to extinguish flames on the roofs of the buildings. Thus, the fire could spread from rooftop to rooftop, and across narrow streets. Many of the affected buildings were made of brick and stone, but with wooden framing. Also, wooden mansard roofs were a common architectural trend of the time period. The steep pitch of a mansard roof allows for more storage in the upper levels of a building. However, these roofs are flammable due to their wooden construction.
Building owners in Boston had few incentives to implement fire-safety measures. Buildings were often insured above value or at full value.
In 1852, Boston became the first city in the world to install telegraph-based fire alarm boxes. The boxes served as a fire warning system. If the lever inside of the alarm box was pulled, the fire department was notified, and the alarm could be traced back to the box via a coordinate system so that firefighters were dispatched to the correct location. All of the fire alarm boxes were kept locked from when the system was installed in 1852 until after the Great Fire of 1872 to prevent false alarms. A few citizens in each area of Boston were given a key to the boxes, and all other citizens had to report fires to the key-holders, who could then alert the fire department. In 1872, witnesses watched the fire spread before the area's key-holder was found and could unlock the alarm box to alert the Boston Fire Department. Twenty minutes after the fire was first noticed, firefighters arrived on the scene.
John Damrell, Boston Fire Department's chief engineer at the time, had told Boston officials that the existing water infrastructure was inadequate. He was told not to "magnify the needs of his department" after requesting funding for water infrastructure repairs. The existing water main pipelines were old and leaky, making the pressure in the pipes lower than acceptable. There were not enough hydrants throughout the city to adequately cover the surrounding buildings. As the fire spread, firefighters struggled to find hydrants with adequate water pressure. Also, the fire hydrant couplings were not standardized within Boston, making it more difficult for firefighters to connect their hoses and related equipment.
The Boston Fire Department used horses to pull fire engines, hoses, and ladders. At the time of the 1872 fire in early November, the northeast United States was experiencing an epizootic equine flu that affected and weakened the horses. When Damrell heard of the horse sickness, he preemptively hired an additional 500 men to replace the horsepower that would typically haul the engines and other equipment to the sites of fires. After the fire, the city commission in charge of investigating the fire concluded that the response time of the fire department was only delayed by a few minutes in the absence of the horses.
Similarities to Great Chicago Fire
In 1871, Chicago had suffered massive destruction and an estimated 300 casualties in the Great Chicago Fire. Damrell, along with fire chiefs from various large cities, traveled to Chicago after the fire in an attempt to learn from the city's mistakes. Like Boston, Chicago buildings were made primarily of wood and building codes were not enforced, making the densely developed neighborhoods susceptible to fire. General Phil Sheridan, in charge of military relief in Chicago post-fire, did not condemn the city's use of gunpowder to blow up buildings to create firebreaks. In theory, a firebreak creates a gap in flammable material that serves as a barrier where the fire will run out of "fuel" to spread any further. However, many fire chiefs from Southern cities were firmly opposed to gunpowder-created firebreaks after having seen the destruction they caused in the Civil War. Damrell returned to Boston and continued to request funding for improved water infrastructure and fire equipment.
Experts have deduced that the fire began in the basement of a warehouse on the corner of Kingston Street and Summer Street, at approximately 83–85 Summer Street. In this particular area, most of the buildings were dedicated to retail or used as warehouses. The warehouse that first caught fire housed dry goods. From the basement, the flames spread to the wooden elevator shaft in the center of the building and moved up the floors, fueled by the flammable fabrics in storage. Finally, the building's wooden mansard roof caught on fire and the flames were able to spread from rooftop to rooftop down the street. The heat became so intense that stone facades shattered. The fire spread through most of Boston's financial district which became known as the "burnt district." The glow of the fire was noted in ships' logs by sailors off the coast of Maine.
7 pm, November 9: the fire begins in the basement of a warehouse.
7:24 pm, November 9: first alarm is received from Box 52.
8 pm, November 9: all 21 of Boston's fire engines are at the scene of the fire.
10 pm, November 9: the fire spread to a three block radius.
12 am, November 10: the fire spread to a five block radius.
4 am, November 10: the fire spread to the waterfront, destroying wharves and docked boats.
6 am, November 10: the fire reached Washington Street and spread through the center of downtown.
midday, November 10: the fire is stopped and contained before it destroys Old South Meeting House.
At 7:24 pm, the first alarm was received from Box 52 at the corner of Summer Street and Lincoln Street. The first fire engine to arrive was Engine Co. 7 from a station at 7 East Street. The first water on the fire came from Hose Company 2 of Hudson Street. By 8 pm, all of Boston's 21 engine companies were fighting the fire. Telegraphs were sent to surrounding towns requesting help, but the messages were delayed due to most telegraph offices already having closed for the night. Eventually, support arrived from fire departments in every state of New England, except Vermont. Of these were two Amoskeag Steamers from Manchester, New Hampshire. One was the first Amoskeag ever constructed (serial number 1), owned by the Manchester Fire Department; the other was the first self-propelled Amoskeag that the manufacturer sent down. Impressed with its performance, Boston purchased the self-propelled steamer after the fire, the first one in use in the country.