Ferdinand Foch ( FOSH, French: [fɛʁdinɑ̃ fɔʃ]; 2 October 1851 – 20 March 1929) was a French general, Marshal of France and a member of the Académie Française and Académie des Sciences. He distinguished himself as Supreme Allied Commander on the Western Front during the First World War in 1918.
A commander during the First Marne, Flanders and Artois campaigns of 1914–1916, Foch became Supreme Allied Commander in late March 1918 in the face of the all-out German spring offensive. He successfully coordinated the French, British and American efforts, deftly handling his strategic reserves. He stopped the German offensive and launched a war-winning counterattack. In November 1918, Marshal Foch accepted the German cessation of hostilities and was present at the Armistice of 11 November 1918.
At the outbreak of war in August 1914, Foch's XX Corps participated in the brief invasion of Germany before retreating in the face of a German counter-attack and successfully blocking the Germans short of Nancy. Ordered west to defend Paris, Foch's prestige soared as a result of the victory at the Marne, for which he was widely credited as a chief protagonist while commanding the French Ninth Army. He was then promoted again to assistant commander-in-chief for the Northern Zone, a role which evolved into command of Army Group North, and in which role he was required to cooperate with the British forces at Ypres and the Somme. At the end of 1916, partly owing to the disappointing results of the latter offensive and partly owing to wartime political rivalries, Foch was transferred to Italy. After being named the commander-in-chief of Western Front with the title Généralissime, Foch was appointed "Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies" on 26 March 1918. He played a decisive role in halting a renewed German advance on Paris in the Second Battle of the Marne, after which he was promoted to Marshal of France. Author Larry H. Addington says, "to a large extent the final Allied strategy which won the war on land in Western Europe in 1918 was Foch's alone."
On 11 November 1918, Foch accepted the German request for an armistice. Foch advocated peace terms that would make Germany unable to pose a threat to France ever again. He considered the Treaty of Versailles too lenient on Germany. Winston Churchill attributed this famous but apocryphal quote about the Peace Treaty of Versailles to Foch: "This is not Peace. It is an Armistice for twenty years." Indeed, the next war broke out 20 years later.
Ferdinand Foch was born in Tarbes, a municipality in the department of Hautes-Pyrénées, in southwestern France, into a modest, devout, middle-class Catholic family. His last name reflects the ancestry of his father, a civil servant from Valentine, a village in Haute-Garonne. From a young age, he loved to study and work, showed great interest in military history and strategy, and was an avid reader of military literature. He attended school in Tarbes, Rodez, Gourdan-Polignan and at the Jesuit Collège Saint-Michel in Saint-Étienne before attending the Jesuit Collège Saint-Clément in Metz. A professor there once said of Foch, "A geometric mind, he is made for the Polytechnique." His brother, Germain Foch, became a Jesuit priest, which may have hindered Foch's rise in the French Army since the Republican government of France was anti-clerical.
When the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870, the 19-year-old Foch enlisted in the French 4th Infantry Regiment, which did not take part in combat. He remained in the army after the war. In 1871, he passed the entrance exams to the grandes écoles scientifiques and later entered the École Polytechnique. There, he was an excellent, hard-working, and studious student, and pursued studies in mathematics, engineering, science, history, and literature. He eventually chose the school of artillery. In 1873, he received his commission as an artillery officer and served as a lieutenant in the 24th Artillery Regiment in Tarbes, despite not having completed his course, because there was a shortage of junior officers. In 1876, he attended the cavalry school of Saumur to train as a mounted artillery officer. On 30 September 1878, he became a captain and arrived in Paris on 24 September 1879 as an assistant in the Central Personnel Service Depot of the artillery.
In 1885 Foch undertook a course at the École Supérieure de Guerre where he was later an instructor from 1895 to 1901. He was promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1898, and colonel in 1903. As a colonel he became regimental commander of the 35th Artillery Regiment (35e R.A) at Vannes. Foch was known for his physical strength and his sharp mind who always maintained a highly dignified bearing. Foch was a quiet man, known for saying little and when he did speak, it was a volley of words accompanied by much gesturing of his hands that required some knowledge of him to understand properly. One of Foch's favourite phrases was "Pas de protocole!" as he preferred to be approachable by all officers. Foch's only rigidity was always taking his meals at noon and at 7:30; otherwise, he would work all sorts of irregular hours from dawn until well into the night.
In 1907 Foch was promoted to Général de Brigade, and in the same year, he assumed command of the French War College. He held this position until 1911, the year in which he was appointed Général de Division. Foch influenced General Joseph Joffre (Chief of General Staff, 28 July 1911 – 12 December 1916) when he drafted the French plan of campaign (Plan XVII) in 1913. In 1913 he took command of XX Corps at Nancy, and he had held this appointment for exactly one year when he led XX Corps into battle in August 1914.
Foch was later acclaimed as "the most original military thinker of his generation". He was a disciple of Napoleon, and made use of the lessons taught by Moltke. He became known for his critical analyses of the Franco-Prussian and Napoleonic campaigns and of their relevance to military operations in the new twentieth century. His re-examination of France's defeat in 1870 was among the first of its kind. At the college, Foch was a professor of military history, strategy, and general tactics while becoming the French theorist on offensive strategies. He also employed mathematical terms in his lectures.
During his time as an instructor, Foch created renewed interest in French military history, inspired confidence in a new class of French officers, and brought about "the intellectual and moral regeneration of the French Army". His thinking on military doctrine was shaped by the Clausewitzian philosophy, then uncommon in France, that "the will to conquer is the first condition of victory." Collections of his lectures, which reintroduced the concept of the offensive to French military theory, were published in the volumes "Des Principes de la Guerre" ("On the Principles of War") in 1903, and "De la Conduite de la Guerre" ("On the Conduct of War") in 1904. Both "thought" and "will" were the key words of these teachings. While Foch advised "qualification and discernment" in military strategy and cautioned that "recklessness in attack could lead to prohibitive losses and ultimate failure", his concepts, distorted and misunderstood by contemporaries, became associated with the extreme offensive doctrines (l'offensive à outrance) of his successors. The cult of the offensive came to dominate military circles, and Foch's reputation was damaged when his books were cited in the development of the disastrous offensives that brought France close to ruin and the army to mutiny in 1917.
Foch was seen as a master of the Napoleonic school of military thought, but he was the only one of the Military College Commandants (Maillard, Langlois, Bonnal) still serving. Their doctrines had been challenged, not only by the German school, but also since about 1911 by a new French school inspired by General Loiseau de Grandmaison, which criticised them as lacking in vigour and offensive spirit and contributing to needless dispersion of force. The French Army fought under the new doctrines, but they failed in the first battles of August 1914, and it remained to be seen whether the Napoleonic doctrine would hold its own, would give way to doctrines evolved during the war, or would incorporate the new moral and technical elements into a new outward form within which the spirit of Napoleon remained unaltered. The war gave an ambiguous answer to these questions, which remains a source of controversy among experts.