Delta Air Lines Flight 191 was a regularly scheduled Delta Air Lines domestic flight from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to Los Angeles, California, with an intermediate stop at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW). On August 2, 1985, the Lockheed L-1011 TriStar operating Flight 191 encountered a microburst while on approach to land at DFW. The aircraft impacted ground just over one mile (1.6 km) short of the runway, struck a car near the airport, collided with two water tanks and disintegrated. Out of the 163 occupants on board, 136 people died and 25 others were injured in the accident, while the driver of the car struck by the aircraft also died.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the crash resulted from the flight crew's decision to fly through a thunderstorm, the lack of procedures or training to avoid or escape microbursts and the lack of hazard information on wind shear. Forecasts of microbursts improved in the following years, with the 1994 crash of USAir Flight 1016 being the only subsequent microburst-induced crash of a commercial, fixed-wing aircraft in the United States as of 2026.
The accident aircraft was a Lockheed L-1011-385-1 TriStar (registration number N726DA). It was delivered to Delta Air Lines on February 28, 1979, and had operated continuously until the accident. Three Rolls-Royce RB211-22B engines powered the aircraft.
The crew consisted of three flight crew members and eight cabin crew members. Of the 11 crew members, only 3 flight attendants survived.
In command of Flight 191 was Captain Edward Michael "Ted" Connors Jr., aged 57, who had been a Delta employee since 1954. He qualified to captain the TriStar in 1979 and had passed his proficiency checks. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) mentioned in its final report that past flight crews who had flown with Connors described him as a meticulous pilot who strictly adhered to company policies. The report also stated that Connors "deviated around thunderstorms even if other flights took more direct routes" and "willingly accepted suggestions from his flight crew." Since his qualification in 1979, Connors had passed all eight en route inspections that he had undergone; the NTSB report also noted that he had received "favorable comments" regarding "cockpit discipline and standardization." Connors had logged over 29,300 hours of flight time, 3,000 of them in the TriStar.
First Officer Rudolph Przydzial "Rudy" Price Jr., age 42, had been a Delta employee since 1970. Delta captains who flew with Price described him as an "above average first officer" who possessed "excellent knowledge" of the TriStar. Price had logged 6,500 flight hours, including 1,200 in the TriStar. Flight Engineer Nicholas Nestor "Nick" Nassick, age 43, had been a Delta employee since 1976. He had logged 6,500 hours of flight time, including 4,500 in the TriStar. Fellow Delta employees described Nassick as "observant, alert, and professional."
Connors had served with the United States Navy from 1950 to 1954 and fought during two tours in the Korean War. Price had served with the United States Navy from 1964 to 1970 and fought in four tours in the Vietnam War. Nassick had served with the United States Air Force from 1963 to 1976 and had fought in four tours during the Vietnam War.
Of the 152 passengers, 128 were killed in the crash. Twelve of the twenty-four survivors were seated in a cluster near the aircraft's tail. The NTSB report lists 126 passenger fatalities rather than 128, but notes that two of the passengers listed as survivors died more than thirty days after the crash, on September 13 and October 4, 1985. Of the dead, seventy-three originated from the Miami metropolitan area; forty-five were from Broward County, nineteen were from Palm Beach County and nine were from Dade County.
Among the deaths was Don Estridge, known to the world as the father of the IBM PC; he died aboard the flight along with his wife. Two IBM summer interns, four IBM employees from the IBM branch office in Burbank, California, and six additional family members of IBM employees also perished.
Flight 191 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport to Los Angeles International Airport, with a scheduled stop at Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport (DFW). The flight departed Fort Lauderdale on an instrument flight rules flight plan at 14:10 Central Daylight Time (UTC−05:00). The flight's dispatch weather forecast for DFW stated a "possibility of widely scattered rain showers and thunderstorms." Another dispatch weather alert warned of "an area of isolated thunderstorms ... over Oklahoma and northern and northeastern Texas." The flight crew reviewed these notices before takeoff.
As the aircraft flew past New Orleans, Louisiana, a weather formation near the Gulf Coast strengthened. The flight crew decided to deviate from the intended route to make the more northerly Blue Ridge arrival to DFW. The flight held for ten to fifteen minutes over the Texarkana VORTAC. At 17:35, the crew received an Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) broadcast for weather on approach to DFW, and the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) air traffic controller cleared the flight to the Blue Ridge VORTAC and instructed the flight to descend to 25,000 feet (7,600 m).
At 17:43:45, the Fort Worth ARTCC controller cleared the flight down to 10,000 feet (3,000 m). The controller suggested they fly a heading of 250° toward the Blue Ridge approach, but Connors replied that the route would take them through a storm cell, stating, "I'd rather not go through it, I'd rather go around it one way or the other." After a brief exchange, the controller gave the flight a new heading. At 17:46:50, the controller cleared the flight direct to Blue Ridge and instructed the crew to descend to 9,000 feet (2,700 m). Connors expressed his relief that the controller did not send them on the original trajectory. At 17:51:19, Nassick commented, "Looks like it's raining over Fort Worth." At 17:51:42, the Fort Worth ARTCC controller transferred the flight to DFW Airport Approach Control, which cleared the flight to descend to 7,000 feet (2,100 m). Two minutes later, the controller asked Flight 191 to deviate by 10° and to slow their airspeed to 180 knots (210 mph; 330 km/h). The crew acknowledged the request. As the flight descended, the crew prepared the aircraft for landing. At 17:56:19, the feeder controller cleared the flight down to 5,000 feet (1,500 m). Nine seconds later, the controller announced that rain was north of the airport, and that the airport would be using instrument landing system (ILS) approaches.
At 17:59:47, Price said, "We're gonna get our airplane washed." Around the same time, Connors switched to the arrival radio frequency and informed the approach controller that they were flying at 5,000 feet (1,500 m). The controller replied that the flight should expect to approach Runway 17L (now 17C). At 18:00:36, the approach controller asked an American Airlines flight that was two aircraft ahead of Flight 191, and on the same approach, if they could see the airport. The American Airlines flight responded, "As soon as we break out of this rain shower, we will." At 18:00:51, Flight 191 was instructed to slow to 170 knots (200 mph; 310 km/h) and to turn to heading 270°. Flight 191 was instructed to descend to 3,000 feet (910 m) at 18:01:34. One minute later, the approach controller turned the flight toward Runway 17L and cleared them for an ILS approach at or above 2,300 feet (700 m). Half a minute afterward, the controller asked the flight to reduce their speed to 160 knots (180 mph; 300 km/h), which the crew acknowledged. At 18:03:30 the controller advised, "And we're getting some variable winds out there due to a shower ... out there north end of DFW." Several seconds later, an unidentified flight crew member commented, "Stuff is moving in."
Just three miles (5 km) ahead of Flight 191, a Learjet 25 was on the same approach to Runway 17L. While on final approach, the Learjet flew through the storm north of the airport and encountered what was later described as "light to moderate turbulence". The Learjet encountered heavy rain and lost all forward visibility, but was able to continue its ILS approach and land safely. When later asked why he did not report weather conditions to the tower, the Learjet's captain testified that he had nothing to report because "the only thing that we encountered was the heavy rain." The tower controller handling landings on Runway 17L saw lightning from the storm cell after the Learjet landed, but before he saw Flight 191 emerge from the storm.