The Battle of Malplaquet took place on 11 September 1709 during the War of the Spanish Succession, near Taisnières-sur-Hon in France, then part of the Spanish Netherlands. A French army of around 75,000 men, commanded by the Duke of Villars, engaged a Grand Alliance force of 86,000 under the Duke of Marlborough. In one of the bloodiest battles of the 18th century, the latter won a narrow victory, but suffered heavy casualties.
Allied advances in 1708 led to the renewal of peace talks, which collapsed in April 1709. After taking Tournai in early September, the Allies besieged Mons, whose capture would allow them to enter France itself, and Louis XIV ordered Villars to prevent its loss. Although this proved impossible, he decided to fight anyway, and the two armies made contact on 10 September. Marlborough's attack was delayed until the next day, giving the French time to construct strong defensive positions.
After an opening artillery barrage, the Allied infantry made simultaneous assaults on the French flanks. These were intended to divert troops from their centre, weakening it sufficiently so it could then be broken by a mass allied cavalry charge. Although successful in previous battles, at Malplaquet the flank attacks incurred heavy casualties, while the French cavalry ensured their centre did not collapse. This allowed their infantry to retreat in good order, with the victors too exhausted to conduct a pursuit.
Most historians estimate Allied losses as about 22,000 killed or wounded, those of the French being around 11,000. These levels shocked contemporaries, and heightened internal divisions within the Grand Alliance over the wisdom of continuing the war. By saving his army, Villars ultimately enabled Louis to negotiate far better peace terms in 1713 than those available in 1709. However, it did little to change the immediate strategic situation; Mons surrendered shortly afterward and the Allied advance resumed in 1710.
By early 1709, the French state was bankrupt, while the severe winter of 1708–1709 caused widespread famine, with garrisons at Tournai, Arras, St Omer, Valenciennes and Cambrai all mutinying over lack of food and pay. Desperate to end the war, Louis XIV initiated peace talks with the Grand Alliance in The Hague. He accepted most of their terms, including replacing his grandson Philip V of Spain with the Habsburg candidate Archduke Charles, the principle for which they were ostensibly fighting. However, he and his ministers could not agree to the demand French troops be used to remove Philip, and talks broke down at the end of April. When the 1709 campaign began, Louis ordered Villars, his commander in Northern France, to avoid battle and to prevent any further deterioration in the French position. Ordinarily an extremely aggressive general, Villars instead built defensive lines along the River Scarpe, running from Saint-Venant to Douai.
Convinced France was on the verge of collapse, the allies looked to keep up the pressure by advancing through the line of border fortresses known as the Frontière de fer. However, unlike France, whose strategy was ultimately determined by Louis XIV, theirs had to be approved separately by the British, Dutch and Austrian governments, which often required compromise. Marlborough, the allied commander, considered the positions held by Villars too strong for a frontal assault, and since Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Dutch opposed his preferred option of Ypres, he agreed to make Tournai the main objective for 1709.
Although persistent heavy rain caused further delays, on 15 June the allies began the siege of Tournai, one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. The garrison of 7,700 surrendered on 3 September, and Marlborough immediately marched on Mons. Having assumed Tournai would hold out until October and thus consume the entire 1709 campaign season, Louis now ordered Villars to prevent the loss of Mons "at all costs...the salvation of France is at stake". Despite this plea, Villars was too late to prevent the town being encircled on 6 September by the Prince of Hesse-Kassel, with an advance force of 60 squadrons and 4,000 infantry.
Marlborough and Eugene did not expect Villars to risk a pitched battle anymore and resigned themselves to another gruelling siege, but Villars, bolstered by his undefeated record, was confident that he could secure a victory that would shift the war in France's favour. Louis attempted to temper Villars' confidence with caution, suggesting that the difficult terrain warranted limiting operations to disrupting the siege but Villars was determined to force a battle. The main Allied army arrived east of the town on 7 September, awaiting the arrival of their siege artillery from Tournai. Villars took up positions to the southwest on the 9th, leaving the two forces facing each other across the gap of Malplaquet.
While conscious of the implications of defeat, Villars informed Louis XIV his army would dissolve if he did not fight. This decision gave him the advantage of choosing the battlefield, while his presence nearby prevented the allies from beginning the siege of Mons, since he could either launch a relief attack, or cut their supply lines to Brussels by crossing the Trouille River.
On 9 September, Marlborough and Eugene struggled to assemble their widely dispersed forces amid heavy rain and confusion, only managing to form a battle line by the end of the day. Despite this Villars maintained his position, which has been criticised by some observers and historians, including the Charles Sevin de Quincy, who wrote that "if Marshal de Villars wanted to take advantage of the negligence of the enemy generals, he would obtain an assured victory without much difficulty."
The allies themselves delayed their attack pending the arrival of 21 battalions from Tournai under Henry Withers. This decision was also criticised at the time and later, one analyst arguing "the battle should have taken place on 10 September, or not at all". This gave Villars an extra day to construct defensive positions, including earthworks covering the open ground in the centre, and additional entrenchments extending into the woods on either side.
Marlborough's plan was the same as that employed at Blenheim, Ramillies and Oudenarde. On each occasion, frontal assaults on the French flanks forced them to move troops from the centre, which was then broken by mass cavalry attacks. Although the leading units suffered many casualties, allied losses were substantially less than those they inflicted. At Malplaquet the French held strong defensive positions, were better led, and highly motivated.
Villars had also learned from Ramillies, where Villeroy arguably contributed to his own defeat by over-extending his line. He was helped by the fact that the battlefield at Malplaquet was much more restricted, allowing him to concentrate his infantry in defensive positions. It also prevented Marlborough from quickly shifting troops between wings, a tactic he often adopted to keep opponents off balance.
The French army consisted of 80 guns and 75,000 to 90,000 men, including significant numbers of Bavarian and Swiss mercenaries, as well as the Irish Brigade. Villars commanded the left, de la Colonie led the centre, with the right, where Villars had placed the bulk of the infantry, led by 67-year-old Marshal Louis-François de Boufflers, who was senior to Villars in rank but volunteered to serve under him. The infantry held a continuous line of entrenchments supported by artillery, with the cavalry massed in the rear.
The allied forces, in turn, ranged from 86,000 to 110,000, with the right wing formed of 30,000 German and Danish infantry led by Prince Eugene. Marlborough positioned himself in the centre, where he placed 8,000 mostly British infantry commanded by the Earl of Orkney, with the bulk of the 30,000 cavalry to their rear. Finally, the allied left was held by the Dutch, with 18,000 infantry under the Prince of Orange, plus 10,000 cavalry under the Prince of Hesse-Kassel. Control was exercised by Count Tilly, who had succeeded Lord Overkirk as senior Dutch commander.