The Battle of Kasserine Pass was a series of engagements which took place from 19–24 February 1943 around Kasserine Pass, a 2-mile-wide (3.2 km) gap in the Grand Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains in west central Tunisia. It was a part of the Tunisian campaign of World War II.
The Axis forces, led by Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, were primarily from the Afrika Korps Assault Group, the Italian Centauro Armored Division and two Panzer divisions detached from the 5th Panzer Army. The Allied forces were from the U.S. II Corps (Major General Lloyd Fredendall), the British 6th Armoured Division (Major General Charles Keightley) and other parts of the First Army (Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson).
The battle was the first major engagement between U.S. and Axis forces in Africa. The participating American battalions suffered many casualties and were successively pushed back over 50 miles (80 km) from their original positions west of Faïd Pass, until they met an advancing brigade of the U.S. 1st Armored Division. British forces were also driven back, losing all 11 of their tanks in the process. After these reverses, Allied reinforcements backed by strong artillery support halted the Axis offensive at Djebel el Ahma and Thala. By this point, Rommel was overextended and low on reserves, fuel and ammunition. Faced with such logistical problems alongside Allied counterattacks, Axis forces relinquished all their territorial gains and withdrew under heavy bombardment from the Kasserine Pass by 24 February.
Anderson was subsequently criticised by his contemporaries for, among other things, dispersing the three combat commands of the 1st Armored Division, despite the objections of the divisional commander, Major General Orlando Ward. As a result of lessons learned in this battle, the U.S. Army instituted sweeping changes in unit organization and tactics, and replaced some commanders and some types of equipment.
U.S. and British forces landed at several points along the coast of French Morocco and Algeria on November 8, 1942, during Operation Torch. This came only days after the breakthrough of the British Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery) following the Second Battle of El Alamein. In response, German and Italian troops were ferried in from Sicily to occupy Tunisia, one of the few easily defended areas of North Africa and only one night's sail from bases in Sicily. This short passage made it very difficult for Allied naval vessels to intercept Axis transports, and air interdiction proved equally difficult, because the nearest Allied airbase to Tunisia, at Malta, was over 200 mi (320 km) away.
The Run for Tunis in November and December 1942 is the term for an attempt to reach Tunis before German and Italian reinforcements could arrive. Because of the poor road and rail communications, only a small, division-sized Allied force could be supplied and due to the excellent defensive terrain, small numbers of German and Italian troops were sufficient to defeat the attempt. The Allied build-up continued, more aircraft became available and new airfields in eastern Algeria and Tunisia were built. The Allies reduced the flow of Axis troops and equipment into Tunis and Bizerta, but a sizable Axis force was already ashore.
On January 23, 1943, the Allied Eighth Army took Tripoli, Erwin Rommel's main supply base. Rommel had anticipated this, switching his line of supply to Tunis with the goal of blocking the southern approach to Tunisia from Tripoli at Gabès. The Mareth Line, which the French had built to protect against an Italian attack from Libya, was
... a line of antiquated French blockhouses, which in no way measured up to the standards required by modern warfare....
Allied troops had already crossed the Atlas Mountains and set up a forward base at Faïd, in the foothills on the eastern arm of the mountains, an excellent position to thrust east to the coast, split the Axis forces in southern Tunisia from the forces further north, and cut the line of supply to Tunis.
Elements of the 5th Panzer Army, headed by General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, reached the Allied positions on the eastern foot of the Atlas Mountains on January 30. The 21st Panzer Division met French troops at Faïd, and, despite excellent use of the French 75 mm (2.95 in) guns, which caused heavy casualties among the German infantry, the defenders were easily forced back.
U.S. artillery and tanks of the 1st Armored Division then entered the battle, destroying some enemy tanks and forcing the remainder into what appeared to be a headlong retreat. This was, however, a trap, and when the 1st Armored Division gave chase it was engaged by a screen of German anti-tank guns, and sustained heavy casualties. A U.S. forward artillery observer whose radio and landlines had been cut by shellfire recalled,
It was murder. They rolled right into the muzzles of the concealed eighty-eights and all I could do was stand by and watch tank after tank blown to bits or burst into flames or just stop, wrecked. Those in the rear tried to turn back but the eighty-eights seemed to be everywhere.
The 21st Panzer Division resumed its advance towards Faïd. American infantry casualties were exacerbated by the practice of digging shallow shell scrapes instead of foxholes, as German tank drivers could easily crush a man inside a scrape by driving into it and simultaneously making a half-turn. Several attempts were made by the 1st Armored Division to stop the German advance, but all three combat commands found that each defensive position they tried to occupy had already been overrun, and they were attacked by German troops with heavy losses. On February 2, the 1st Armored Division was ordered to end its attacks and concentrate to form a reserve. The Germans captured most of Tunisia, and the entrances into the coastal lowlands were blocked. The Allies held the interior of the roughly triangular Atlas range, but with the exits blocked this was of little advantage to the Allies. For the next two weeks, Rommel and the Axis commanders further north debated what to do next.
Rommel did not consider the Eighth Army a serious threat because, until Tripoli was open, Montgomery could maintain only a small force in south Tunisia. Ships commenced unloading on February 9 but the port was not fully operational until the end of the month. Rommel made a proposal in early February to Comando Supremo (Italian High Command in Rome) to attack with two battlegroups, including detachments from the 5th Panzer Army, toward two U.S. supply bases just to the west of the western arm of the mountains in Algeria. A quick thrust could capture the supplies and disrupt a U.S. attempt to concentrate forces near Tébessa. Arnim objected and the attack was delayed for a week until agreement was reached to mount Operation Frühlingswind, a thrust by the 5th Panzer Army through the U.S. communications and supply center of Sidi Bou Zid. Rommel's forces, 60 miles (97 km) to the south-west, would conduct Operation Morgenluft to capture Gafsa and advance on Tozeur.
On February 14 the 10th and 21st Panzer divisions began the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid, about 10 mi (16 km) west of Faïd, in the interior plain of the Atlas Mountains. The U.S. tanks were defeated and the infantry, poorly sited on three hills and unable to give mutual support, was isolated. A counterattack the next day was easily repulsed and on February 16 the Germans advanced towards Sbeitla. After the success at Sidi Bou Zid, Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps Assault Group to attack Gafsa on February 15, but the night before, Anderson ordered the defenders to evacuate Gafsa and make the main defence line the hills around Feriana, as he believed Gafsa should not be defended against a large attack. The next day, because of the threat to the southern flank, Anderson obtained Eisenhower's agreement and ordered a withdrawal from the Eastern Dorsale, to the line of the Western Dorsale from Feriana northwards. Early on February 17, Fredendall ordered a withdrawal from Sbeitla and Feriana. The U.S. II Corps was able to concentrate at the Kasserine and Sbiba Passes, on the western arm of the mountains. U.S. casualties were 2,546 men, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, three anti-tank guns and an anti-aircraft battery.