The Battle of Edgehill (or Edge Hill) was a pitched battle of the First English Civil War. It was fought near Edge Hill and Kineton in southern Warwickshire on Sunday, 23 October 1642.
All attempts at constitutional compromise between King Charles and Parliament broke down early in 1642. Both the King and Parliament raised large armies to gain their way by force of arms. In October, at his temporary base near Shrewsbury, the King decided to march to London in order to force a decisive confrontation with Parliament's main army, commanded by the Earl of Essex.
Late on 22 October, both armies unexpectedly found the enemy to be close by. The next day, the Royalist army descended from Edge Hill to force battle. After the Parliamentarian artillery opened a cannonade, the Royalists attacked. Both armies consisted mostly of inexperienced and sometimes ill-equipped troops. Many men from both sides fled or fell out to loot enemy baggage, and neither army was able to gain a decisive advantage.
After the battle, the King resumed his march on London, but was not strong enough to overcome the defending militia before Essex's army could reinforce them. The inconclusive result of the Battle of Edgehill prevented either faction from gaining a quick victory in the war, which eventually lasted four years.
When it appeared to King Charles I that no agreement with Parliament over the government of the kingdom was possible, he left London on 2 March 1642 and headed for the north of England. Both Parliament and King realised that armed conflict was inevitable, and prepared to raise forces. Parliament enacted a Militia Ordinance, by which it claimed authority over the country's Trained Bands, while from his temporary capital of York, Charles rejected Parliament's Nineteen Propositions and issued Commissions of Array, directing the Lord Lieutenant of each county to raise forces for the King.
The King then attempted to seize the port of Kingston-upon-Hull where arms and equipment previously collected for the Bishops' Wars had been gathered. In the Siege of Hull, the Parliamentarian garrison defied the King's authority and drove his forces away from the city. In early August the King moved south, to Lincoln and Leicester, where he secured the contents of the local armouries. On 22 August, he took a decisive step by raising the royal standard in Nottingham, effectively declaring war on Parliament.
The Midlands were generally Parliamentarian in sympathy, and few people rallied to the King there, so having again secured the arms and equipment of the local trained bands, Charles moved to Chester and subsequently to Shrewsbury, where large numbers of recruits from Wales and the Welsh border were expected to join him. (By this time, there was conflict in almost every part of England, as local commanders attempted to seize the main cities, ports and castles for their respective factions.)
Having learned of the King's actions in Nottingham, Parliament dispatched its own army northward under the Earl of Essex, to confront the King. Essex marched first to Northampton, where he mustered almost 20,000 men. Learning of the King's move westwards, Essex then marched north-westwards towards Worcester. On 23 September, in the first clash between the main Royalist and Parliamentarian armies, Royalist cavalry under Prince Rupert of the Rhine routed the cavalry of Essex's vanguard at the Battle of Powick Bridge. Nevertheless, lacking infantry, the Royalists abandoned Worcester.
By early October, the King's army was almost complete at Shrewsbury. He held a council of war, at which two courses of action were considered. The first was to attack Essex's army at Worcester, which had the drawback that the close country around the city would put the superior Royalist cavalry at a disadvantage. The second course, which was adopted, was to advance towards London. The intention was not to avoid battle with Essex, but to force one at an advantage. In the Earl of Clarendon's words: "it was considered more counsellable to march towards London, it being morally sure that Essex would put himself in their way." Accordingly, the army left Shrewsbury on 12 October, gaining two days' start on the enemy, and moved south-east. Essex followed, but neither army had much information on the location of their enemy.
By 22 October, the Royalist army was quartered in the villages around Edgcote, and was threatening the Parliamentarian post at Banbury. The garrison of Banbury sent messengers pleading for help to the garrison of Warwick Castle. Essex, who had just reached there, ordered an immediate march to Kineton to bring relief to Banbury, even though his army had straggled and not all his troops were present. That evening, there were clashes between outposts and quartermasters' parties in Kineton and the villages nearby, and the Royalists had their first inkling that Essex's army was close by. The King issued orders for his army to muster for battle on top of the escarpment of Edge Hill the following day.
Essex originally intended marching straight to the relief of Banbury, but at about 8 a.m. on 23 October, his outposts reported that the Cavaliers were massed on Edge Hill, 4.5 miles (7.2 km) from Kineton. Essex deployed his army about halfway between Kineton and the Royalist army, where hedges formed a natural position.
The well known "Soldiers' Prayer" was given by Jacob Astley before the battle.
There were some significant differences between the opposing armies, which were to be important to the course of the battle and its outcome. Although both armies were composed of very raw soldiers, they had several experienced officers who had previously fought in the Dutch or Swedish armies during the Thirty Years' War. Several of them had been recruited to lead English forces which were intended to be sent to Ireland following the Irish Rebellion of 1641. Both King and Parliament had bid highly for their services.
The Royalist cavalry was superior to Parliament's cavalry at this stage of the war. Oliver Cromwell, who possibly arrived late to the battle, later wrote disparagingly to John Hampden, "Your troopers are most of them old decayed servingmen and tapsters; and their [the Royalists] troopers are gentlemen's sons, younger sons and persons of quality...." Not only were the Parliamentarian cavalry not so naturally accustomed to mounted action, but they were drilled in the Dutch tactic of firing pistols and carbines from the saddle, whereas under Rupert, the Royalist cavalry would charge sword in hand, relying on shock and weight.
The Parliamentarian foot soldiers, however, were better equipped than their Royalist counterparts. The Royalist pikemen were said to lack armour, and the musketeers lacked swords, making the Royalist infantry more vulnerable in hand-to-hand combat. Several hundred of them lacked any sort of weapon apart from clubs or improvised polearms.
The Royalist right wing of cavalry and dragoons was led by Prince Rupert, with Sir John Byron in support. The King's own Lifeguard of Horse insisted on joining Rupert's front line, leaving the King with no cavalry reserve under his own command.
The centre consisted of five "tertias" of infantry. There was a last-minute change of command when the Colonel General, Lord Lindsey, was overruled when he wished to deploy them in "Dutch" formation, simple phalanxes eight ranks deep. Affronted, he resigned his command and took his place at the head of his own regiment of foot. He was replaced by the Lieutenant General, Patrick Ruthven, who drew up the infantry in chequerboard "Swedish" formation, which was potentially more effective but also more difficult to control, particularly with inexperienced soldiers. The centre was led in battle by Sergeant Major General Jacob Astley.
The left wing consisted of horse under Sir Henry Wilmot, with Lord Digby, the King's secretary of state, in support and Colonel Arthur Aston's dragoons on his left flank.