On January 4, 1987, two trains collided on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor main line near Chase, Maryland, United States, at Gunpow Interlocking. Amtrak train 94, the Colonial, (now part of the Northeast Regional) traveling north from Washington, D.C., to Boston, crashed at over 100 miles per hour (160 km/h) into a set of Conrail locomotives running light (without freight cars) that had fouled the mainline. Fourteen passengers on the Amtrak train died, as well as the Amtrak engineer and lounge car attendant.
The Conrail locomotive crew failed to stop at the signals before Gunpow Interlocking, and it was determined that the accident would have been avoided had they done so. Additionally, they tested positive for cannabis. The engineer served four years in a Maryland prison for his role in the crash. In the aftermath, drug and alcohol procedures for train crews were overhauled by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), which is charged with rail safety. In 1991, prompted in large part by this crash, the United States Congress took even broader action and authorized mandatory random drug-testing for all employees in "safety-sensitive" jobs in all industries regulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) including trucking, bus carriers and rail systems. Additionally, all trains operating on the high-speed Northeast Corridor are now equipped with automatic cab signaling with an automatic train stop feature. Several safety issues were identified with Amfleet cars as well.
At the time, the wreck was the deadliest in Amtrak's history. It was surpassed in 1993 by the Big Bayou Canot rail accident in Alabama where 47 died and another 103 were injured.
Movements of the trains before the collision
Amtrak Train 94 (the Colonial) left Washington Union Station at 12:30 pm (Eastern time) for Boston South Station. The train had 12 coaches and was filled with travelers returning from the holiday season to their homes and schools for the second semester of the year. Two AEM-7 locomotives, numbered 900 and 903, led the train; #903 was the lead locomotive. The engineer was 35-year-old Jerome Evans.
After leaving Baltimore Penn Station, the train's next stop was Wilmington, Delaware. Just north of Baltimore, while still in Baltimore County, the four-track Northeast Corridor narrows to two tracks at Gunpow Interlocking just before crossing over the Gunpowder River. The train accelerated north toward that location.
Ricky Lynn Gates, a Penn Central and Conrail engineer since 1973, was operating a trio of Conrail GE B36-7 locomotives light (with no freight cars) from Conrail's Bayview Yard just east of Baltimore bound for Enola Yard near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Gates was later determined to have violated several signal and operating rules, including a failure to properly test his cab signals as required before departure from Bayview. It was later discovered that someone had disabled the cab signal alerter whistle on lead unit #5044 with duct tape, muting it almost completely. Also, one of the light bulbs in the PRR-style cab signal display had been removed. Investigators believed these conditions probably existed prior to departure from Bayview and that they would have been revealed by a properly performed departure test.
Gates and his brakeman, Edward "Butch" Cromwell, were also smoking cannabis cigarettes. Cannabis can alter one's sense of time and impair the ability to perform tasks that require concentration. Cromwell was responsible for calling out the signals if Gates missed them, but failed to do so.
Amtrak train #94 was north-bound on track #2 of the electrified main line leading to Gunpow Interlocking. As Amtrak was approaching the interlocking, a “light” Conrail consist of three diesel-electric freight locomotives was running north-bound on parallel track #1 in a ferrying move (see photo to right for track identification). Gunpow Interlocking is fully signaled to govern train movements, with all signals mounted on signal bridges straddling the tracks, placing them in clear view of oncoming trains.
Shortly before reaching the Gunpow River bridge, track #1 merges left into track #2 through a number 20 turnout that is controlled by the interlocking. Home signals govern the approach legs of the turnout, with their most restrictive aspect being STOP. Unlike some interlocking arrangements, Gunpow had no provisions for derailing and stopping a car or locomotive that is about to foul a turnout that is aligned against it.
At the time, track #1 was limited to a maximum speed of 80 miles per hour (130 km/h) for passenger trains, and a maximum of 50 miles per hour (80 km/h) for freight. As the Conrail freight consist was running light, it was authorized to travel at up to 60 miles per hour (97 km/h). On the other hand, passenger train speeds as high as 125 miles per hour (201 km/h) were permitted on track #2.
NTSB investigators determined that immediately prior to the collision, the interlocking had been properly configured for through movement on track #2. It was also determined the distant and home signals governing the track #2 approach to the interlocking were both indicating CLEAR, thus permitting Amtrak #94 to proceed through the interlocking at maximum authorized speed. At the same time, the distant and home signals governing track #1 leading to the interlocking were determined to be indicating APPROACH and STOP, respectively, thus requiring that Conrail reduce speed and come to a full stop before reaching the home signal.
Furthermore, it was found that the in-cab signal in the Conrail lead locomotive indicated the STOP aspect being displayed by the home signal as it was approached, but could not indicate an APPROACH aspect, due to the APPROACH indicator lamp not being present in the in-cab signal’s housing. The in-cab signal’s alerter whistle, which would have audibly warned the engineer that the signal aspect had become more restrictive, was found to have been muffled by being wrapped with duct tape. NTSB investigators determined that the whistle was not audible over the noises emitted by the locomotive, even when idling. None of the three Conrail locomotives was equipped with an automatic train stop feature that would have involuntarily cut power and applied the brakes (a so-called “penalty” brake application) should the engineer not acknowledge the in-cab signal when it changed to a more restrictive aspect.
Event recording devices on the Conrail locomotives indicated that the consist was moving at approximately 60 miles per hour (97 km/h) when an emergency brake application was made by engineer Gates. The brake application occurred after passing the distant signal, which as previously noted, was indicating APPROACH, requiring an immediate speed reduction. Gates later claimed he made the brake application when he realized that he didn’t have authorization to proceed through the interlocking. At that point, his consist was moving too fast to stop before passing the home signal. Examination of the interlocking system's computerized event recorder revealed that the Conrail consist forced its way through the turnout and onto track #2 approximately 15 seconds before the collision. Had Gates obeyed the signals—also, had brakeman Cromwell, riding in the cab with Gates, called out the signals as he was required to do, it is likely the Conrail consist could have been stopped before running past the home signal.
Upon entering track #2, the Conrail locomotives caused the interlocking home signal for that track to immediately change to a STOP aspect, after which they came to a halt. At that time, Amtrak #94 was approximately 3,000 ft (910 m) from the stopped Conrail units. With his train approaching Gunpow at more than 120 mph (190 km/h), engineer Evans had little time to react to the sudden signal change and the presence of the Conrail locomotives in his path. He managed to initiate an emergency brake application seconds before the impact occurred at 1:30 pm.
At the point of impact, Amtrak #94 had decelerated to 107 mph (172 km/h) (speed determined from the locomotives’ event recorders). The Conrail consist was stationary with its brakes applied. On impact, the fuel tank of the trailing Conrail locomotive, GE B36-7 #5045, was ruptured, dumping a large quantity of fuel, which ignited and resulted in the locomotive being burned to the frame—the unit was subsequently scrapped. The middle unit, #5052, sustained significant damage to its front end, while lead unit #5044 suffered only minor damage. The force of the impact was so severe unit #5044 was driven forward some 900 feet from the point where the consist had stopped.